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 Appellants Pittsburgh & West Virginia Railroad 
(“PWV”) and Power REIT challenge the District Court’s 
interpretation of a 1962 lease of railroad property (the “Lease”) 
to Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”).1  
In particular, Appellants contest the District Court’s use of 
course-of-performance evidence to bolster its conclusions with 
respect to the disputed Lease provisions.  Appellants also 
challenge the District Court’s finding that they engaged in 
fraud to obtain Norfolk Southern’s consent to a transaction 
otherwise prohibited by the Lease.  We discern no error in the 
District Court’s consideration of course-of-performance 
evidence, its interpretation of the Lease, and its finding of 
fraud.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s rulings.   
 
I. 
 
 Norfolk Southern and PWV entered into the Lease on 
July 12, 1962, under which PWV leased to Norfolk Southern 
all of its right, title, and interest in certain railroad properties 
that it had owned and operated (the “Demised Property”).  The 
Demised Property consists of a 112-mile tract of main line 
railroad (the “Rail Line”) and approximately 20 miles of 
branch rail lines in Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West 
Virginia.  After securing appropriate regulatory approvals, the 
Lease went into effect on October 16, 1964.  The term of the 
Lease is 99 years, renewable in perpetuity at the option of 
Norfolk Southern absent a default.  On May 17, 1990, Norfolk 
Southern entered into a sublease with Appellee Wheeling & 
                                              
 1 Appellee Norfolk Southern is the successor in interest 
to the Norfolk Southern and Western Railway Company, and 
Appellant PWV is the successor in interest to the Pittsburgh & 
West Virginia Railway Company. 
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Lake Erie Railway Company (“Wheeling & Lake Erie”), 
pursuant to which Wheeling & Lake Erie assumed the rights, 
interests, duties, obligations, liabilities, and commitments of 
Norfolk Southern as lessee, including the role as principal 
operator of the Rail Line.  Power REIT is a real estate 
investment trust which, as of its formation in 2011, owns PWV 
as a wholly owned subsidiary.   
  
 The Lease contains several sections relevant to the 
present dispute.  Section 4(a) establishes the rent owed under 
the Lease, which consists of a fixed cash payment of $915,000 
per year.  Section 4(b) provides for several forms of additional 
rent, which include: 
 
(1) Sums equal to the deduction for depreciation 
or amortization with respect to the demised 
property allowed to [PWV] for such year under 
the provisions of the then effective United States 
Internal Revenue Code . . . . 
 
(5) Except as otherwise provided in Section 5 
hereof, all interest, expenses, fees and any other 
sums . . . payable by [PWV] and regardless of 
whether accrued or payable in respect of a period 
prior to the commencement of the term of this 
Lease. The foregoing sums shall be paid or 
discharged by [Norfolk Southern] as and when 
they become due and payable.  
 
(6) Such sums, if any, as may be required to pay 
all obligations reasonably incurred by [PWV] for 
the doing of all acts and things which [PWV] 
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may be lawfully required to do or perform under 
the provisions of this Lease or of any law or by 
any public authority, or for the doing of all acts 
and things necessary or desirable for the 
protection during the existence of this Lease of 
[PWV’s] rights in the demised property or the 
rentals or other sums payable pursuant to this 
Lease, except such obligations incurred by 
[PWV] solely for the benefit of its stockholders 
or reasonably allocable thereto, or in connection 
with nondemised property or reasonably 
allocable thereto.  
 
(7) All taxes, assessments and governmental 
charges, ordinary and extraordinary, regardless 
of whether relating to or accrued or payable in 
respect of a period prior to the effective date of 
this Lease, which are lawfully imposed upon 
[PWV] or the demised property or its income or 
earnings or upon any amount payable to any 
security holder of [PWV] which [PWV] has 
agreed to pay or discharge, except for any 
income taxes of [PWV] incurred with respect to 
rent paid pursuant to Section 4(a) hereof, any 
taxes arising after commencement of the term of 
this Lease in respect of nondemised property or 
the income therefrom, or any taxes incurred by 
[PWV] solely for the benefit of its stockholders 
or reasonably allocable thereto. The foregoing 
sums shall be paid or discharged by [Norfolk 
Southern] as and when they become due and 
payable. 
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(App. 834–35.)  The parties dispute whether additional rent and 
attorneys’ fees are owed under these sections and whether 
Norfolk Southern is in default for failure to pay them.   
 
  Section 9 allows for certain dispositions of the Demised 
Property by Norfolk Southern to third-parties.  Section 9 states: 
 
Such demised property as shall not in the opinion 
of [Norfolk Southern] be necessary or useful 
may be sold, leased or otherwise disposed of by 
[Norfolk Southern], and [PWV] shall execute 
and deliver such instruments as may be 
necessary or appropriate to effectuate such 
transactions; provided, however, that such sales, 
leases or other dispositions of property shall be 
made in compliance with the applicable 
provisions of any mortgage or other agreement 
of [PWV] relating thereto.  The proceeds of sale, 
condemnation, or other disposition of the 
demised property of [PWV] shall, subject to the 
provisions of any mortgage or other agreement 
relating to such property, be paid to [Norfolk 
Southern] and shall be indebtedness of [Norfolk 
Southern] to [PWV].  
 
The parties dispute whether the Lease requires that Norfolk 
Southern pay to PWV or record as indebtedness to PWV the 
proceeds from any licenses, easements, and oil and gas 
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extraction leases of the Demised Property entered into by 
Norfolk Southern pursuant to Section 9.2  
 
 Section 16 governs the payment and accounting of sums 
due as additional rent under Section 4(b) or any amounts owed 
as a result of “dispositions” covered by Section 9.   These 
payments may, at the option of Norfolk Southern, be paid in 
cash or credited to PWV as indebtedness.  Under Section 16(b), 
“the total of such indebtedness . . . shall not exceed at any time 
an amount equal to 5% of the value at such time of the total 
assets of [PWV] as long as any of the obligations of [PWV] 
which have been assumed by [Norfolk Southern] in this Lease 
remain outstanding and unpaid.”  Section 16(b) then requires 
that “[f]rom time to time a balance of the indebtedness arising 
under this Lease of [PWV] to [Norfolk Southern] and of 
[Norfolk Southern] to [PWV] shall be determined.”  To 
comply with Section 16(b), the parties used a “Settlement 
Account” as a mechanism to track the indebtedness owed 
under Sections 4(b)(1)-(4) and Section 9.  The parties dispute 
whether this 5% cap on the balance still applies given that 
Norfolk Southern had paid off all debt it assumed under the 
Lease no later than 1982.  The parties also dispute whether 
Norfolk Southern complied with the terms of the Lease in 
reporting its indebtedness in the Settlement Account.  
 
 The Lease also subjects PWV to certain restrictions as 
long as Norfolk Southern is not in default of its obligations 
under the Lease.  Section 8(a)(1) requires that PWV take all 
action within its control to preserve its corporate existence and 
                                              
 2 PWV estimates that it is owed at least $13.8 million 
“arising from non-sale property dispositions . . . .”  (PWV Brief 
at 50.)  
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Section 8(a)(2) prohibits PWV from issuing any stock without 
Norfolk Southern’s prior written consent, which must not be 
unreasonably withheld.  Section 8(a)(5) restricts PWV’s ability 
to “borrow any money, assume any guaranty, make advances 
(except pursuant to commitments made prior to the date of this 
Lease) or enter into an agreement to make advances. . . .”  
(App. 839.)   Norfolk Southern contends that PWV 
fraudulently induced Norfolk Southern to consent to 
transactions that otherwise ran afoul of these provisions and by 
which Power REIT became the owner of PWV. 
 
 The Lease also, at Section 8(a)(3), requires both parties 
;to permit “at any and all reasonable times” the other party to 
inspect its books and records for any purpose.  (Id.)  The parties 
dispute whether Norfolk Southern is in default for failing to 
comply with a books and records demand.   
 
 From the effective date of the Lease in 1964 until about 
2010, PWV’s sole business was to receive rental income, pay 
corporate expenses, and make dividend payments to its 
shareholders.  In 2007, David Lesser, an investment banker and 
expert in real estate investment trusts (“REITs”),3 began 
acquiring stock in PWV.  He soon became a trustee of PWV 
and revealed his plan to restructure PWV into a private entity 
fully owned by a publicly traded REIT.  Because of the 
                                              
 3 A REIT “is an investment vehicle that enables large 
numbers of investors to pool their capital and share in the 
benefits of real estate investment and financing.”   Theodore S. 
Lynn et al., Real Estate Investment Trusts § 1:1 (2016).  A 
qualifying REIT must distribute 90% of its taxable income to 
its shareholders annually.  Id. at § 1:5.   
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restrictions in Sections 8(a)(2) and 8(a)(5), Lesser required the 
consent of Norfolk Southern to issue any stock.  After 
exchanging emails and phone calls with Norfolk Southern’s 
counsel, Lesser sent Norfolk Southern a Proposed Form S-3 
Registration Statement which discussed PWV’s plan to offer 
existing shareholders the right to purchase common shares of 
PWV (the “rights offering”).  The Proposed S-3 did not, 
however, disclose PWV’s intent to restructure into a privately 
owned subsidiary or its desire to pursue investments in energy 
companies, despite the fact that Lesser had previously 
discussed these plans with PWV’s Board of Directors.  Lesser 
instead assured Norfolk Southern that the Proposed S-3 
“contain[ed] all available information of PWV’s plans at this 
point.”  (App. 12526.)  
 
 Norfolk Southern ultimately gave its consent on the 
basis of the representations made in the Proposed S-3.  Lesser 
then filed, and the SEC approved, the final version of the Form 
S-3.  PWV proceeded with the issuance of stock and raised 
slightly over $1 million.   The restructuring of PWV 
immediately followed and PWV became a private, wholly 
owned subsidiary of Power REIT.4  PWV remains a party to 
the Lease, still owns the Rail Line and other related properties, 
still receives payments under the Lease, and still makes 
dividend payments to Power REIT.   
                                              
 4 This restructuring was accomplished by means of a 
reverse triangular merger.  Power REIT was formed as a REIT 
and, three days later, Power REIT PA, LLC, was formed as a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Power REIT.  Power REIT PA, 
LLC and PWV then merged, with PWV surviving as a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Power REIT.  Power REIT received all 
outstanding shares of PWV.  
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 In June 2011, PWV sent a letter to Norfolk Southern’s 
counsel outlining purported tax issues under the Lease (the 
“Tax Memorandum”).  The Tax Memorandum related to a 
proposed sale of an unused segment of the Rail Line known as 
the West End Branch by Wheeling & Lake Erie to the 
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.  PWV argued that 
the sale would require Norfolk Southern, under Section 4(b)(7) 
of the Lease, to pay a substantial sum in additional rent.  PWV 
also sent Norfolk Southern an invoice totaling $4,487.50 for 
attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with the review of the 
Lease and the tax issues related to the proposed West End 
Branch sale, contending that it was entitled to have Norfolk 
Southern pay this bill pursuant to Section 4(b)(6) of the Lease.    
 
 Norfolk Southern refused to pay the fees and in 
December 2011 initiated a declaratory judgment action seeking 
the District Court’s determination that it was not in default 
under the terms of the Lease.  Specifically, Norfolk Southern 
asserted that, despite PWV’s claims in the Tax Memorandum, 
the West End Branch sale would not result in significant 
additional rent obligations pursuant to Sections 9 and 4(b)(7) 
of the Lease and that Norfolk Southern was not required to pay 
PWV’s legal expenses pursuant to Section 4(b)(6).  Norfolk 
Southern filed a supplement to its complaint in which it sought 
a declaratory judgment that it was not in default for failure to 
comply with PWV’s books and records demand.5  PWV 
                                              
 5 On March 5, 2013, PWV had sought to inspect Norfolk 
Southern’s books and records regarding a wide range of 
documents and communications relating to Norfolk Southern’s 
subleases, including the Wheeling & Lake Erie sublease.  
While both Norfolk Southern and Wheeling & Lake Erie 
contended that they complied with the requests, PWV insisted 
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responded with an Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and several 
Counterclaims.  Those Counterclaims sought declarations that 
Norfolk Southern was in default for failure to pay PWV’s legal 
fees and for failure to pay the additional rent obligations.  PWV 
also supplemented its pleadings to seek a declaration that 
Norfolk Southern was in default for failure comply with 
PWV’s book and records demand.   
 
 Norfolk Southern then filed a second supplement to its 
Complaint, asserting two additional counts.  First, it claimed 
that PWV breached the Lease when it filed its Form S-3 as part 
of its plan to issue new stock.  Second, it argued that PWV 
committed fraud in connection with the consent it obtained 
from Norfolk Southern.  PWV once again filed Answers and 
Affirmative Defenses to these claims.   
 
 After a yearlong discovery process, PWV filed a second 
supplement to its responsive pleading, adding eight 
Counterclaims.  In three of the claims, PWV sought the same 
determinations discussed above—that Norfolk Southern was in 
default for (1) failure to comply with the books and records 
demand; (2) failure to pay PWV’s legal fees on the West End 
Branch matter; and (3) failure to pay additional rent as required 
by Section 4(b)(1).  PWV also filed the following five claims 
sounding in common law: (1) breach of contract for the 
intentional underreporting of the Settlement Account in 
violation of Sections 9 and 16; (2) breach of contract for 
disposing of property without paying the proceeds to PWV in 
cash in violation of Section 16; (3) fraud based on yearly false 
                                              
that they continued to withhold information and were thus in 
default.   
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representations in the Settlement Account of the amount of 
indebtedness and in the concealment of transactions relating to 
PWV’s property; (4) conversion against Wheeling & Lake Erie 
for depriving PWV of its right in and use or possession of its 
property by allowing third parties to drill for oil and gas and 
extract coal; and (5) breach of contract against Norfolk 
Southern for failure to pay additional rent in violation of 
Section 4(b)(1).   
 
 Norfolk Southern then filed a First Amended Complaint 
which asked the District Court to determine (1) the rights and 
obligations of the parties with regard to subsurface extraction; 
and (2) whether Norfolk Southern was in default under the 
Lease for failing to (a) comply with the books and records 
demand; (b) pay PWV’s attorneys’ fees; and (c) make a cash 
payment of additional rent.  The District Court also permitted 
Norfolk Southern to add a request for nominal damages to the 
prayer for relief.  The parties then filed cross motions for partial 
summary judgment.   
 
 Because of the significant overlap among the many 
claims and counterclaims, the District Court succinctly and 
effectively organized its summary judgment analysis into four 
categories: (1) third party agreements affecting the Demised 
Property, (2) the indebtedness provision, (3) the additional rent 
and legal fees dispute, and (4) the books and records demand.6   
                                              
 6 Judge Terrence F. McVerry of the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania should 
be commended for his adept management of this difficult case.  
Despite the long and complex procedural history, Judge 
McVerry, over the course of several opinions, thoroughly 
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 With regard to the first issue, the District Court 
determined that the Lease affords Norfolk Southern (and thus 
Wheeling & Lake Erie) the right to enter into, control, and 
receive the benefits from non-sale third-party agreements, 
including those agreements that relate to subsurface extraction.  
In arriving at this conclusion, the District Court found it 
significant that at the time the Lease was executed, PWV 
transferred to Norfolk Southern non-sale third-party 
agreements that predated the 1962 Lease without requiring 
Norfolk Southern to account for income it received under such 
third-party agreements.   The District Court also relied upon 
uncontroverted evidence that PWV had “assisted Norfolk 
Southern with the execution of new, non-sale third-party 
agreements, and knew that Norfolk Southern received the 
proceeds from the third-party agreements.”  (App. 54.)  The 
Court therefore granted summary judgment to Norfolk 
Southern on this issue, finding that Norfolk Southern was not 
in default for entering into these agreements.  The Court also 
denied PWV’s Counterclaim which sought to hold Wheeling 
& Lake Erie liable for conversion regarding the property that 
was the subject of these agreements.   
 
 The District Court then turned to the dispute regarding 
the indebtedness provision of the lease.  It first found that the 
language and structure of Section 9 of the Lease supported the 
interpretation that “the only ‘dispositions’ that must be tracked 
as indebtedness [from Norfolk Southern to PWV] are fee 
simple conveyances of title to a portion of the Demised 
Property—e.g. outright sales, condemnations or 
abandonments—rather than the licenses, easements, and leases 
                                              
addressed all of the parties’ arguments and provided clear and 
thoughtful analysis.    
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at issue in this case.”  (App. 53.)  Second, the Court determined 
that the 5% cap on total indebtedness no longer applied as 
Norfolk Southern had paid off all debt that it had assumed 
under the Lease by 1982.  Because this cap no longer applied, 
the District Court permitted Norfolk Southern to continue 
tracking additional rent as indebtedness in the Settlement 
Account pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Lease.  Payment of 
the Settlement Account would only become due at the 
termination of the Lease.   
 
 The Court also discussed the reporting of the Settlement 
Account, which the parties used to track indebtedness.  
Because the third party leases were not “dispositions” under 
Section 9 and because the 5% cap no longer applied, Norfolk 
Southern had not underreported the Settlement Account and 
thus had not breached the Lease.  The Court also found the 
fraud claims barred by the gist-of-the-action doctrine.  It 
concluded that the fraud claims arose from an alleged violation 
of the Lease, and were therefore nothing more than a 
restatement of the breach of contract claim.  It ultimately 
granted Norfolk Southern’s motion for summary judgment and 
denied PWV’s motion for summary judgment with respect to 
all claims related to the indebtedness provisions of the Lease.  
 
 The District Court then discussed the additional rent and 
attorneys’ fees issue that PWV raised in the Tax Memorandum.  
Norfolk Southern had sought a declaration that the only 
payment it owed PWV as a result of the West End Branch 
matter was the amount of the income tax liability that PWV 
may incur as a result of the contemplated sale.  The Court also 
determined that the Lease did not require Norfolk Southern to 
pay the requested attorneys’ fees.  It noted that neither of the 
sections relied upon by PWV in bringing this claim mentioned 
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attorneys’ fees despite such language appearing in other 
sections in different contexts.  It thus granted Norfolk 
Southern’s motion for summary judgment and denied PWV’s 
motion for summary judgment with respect to the claims 
related to the Tax Memorandum.    
 
 The District Court next found that Norfolk Southern 
was not in default for its failure to comply with PWV’s March 
5, 2013 books and records demands.  It refused to issue an 
advisory opinion regarding books and records demands 
because Section 8(a)(3) of the Lease clearly provided for them.  
The Court concluded, however, that the disputed March 5, 
2013 demand had been an unreasonable attempt to 
manufacture a default.  It granted summary judgment to 
Norfolk Southern on this issue, and PWV does not dispute this 
ruling on appeal.  
 
 Following a bench trial in which it resolved Norfolk 
Southern’s two remaining claims—breach of contract and 
fraud, the District Court ruled that, based on admissions made 
by Lesser at trial, PWV breached the covenants of the Lease 
by making advances to Power REIT.7  The Court further 
determined that PWV committed fraud in seeking Norfolk 
Southern’s consent to the rights offering.  PWV’s Form S-3 
represented that it contained all available information 
regarding the requested consent but made no mention of either 
PWV’s plans to restructure or its intention to invest in energy 
companies.  Despite these findings, however, the Court only 
                                              
7 Although this claim was not included in Norfolk 
Southern’s pleadings, the District Court found that the parties 
impliedly consented to litigate it.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2).  
PWV does not dispute this conclusion on appeal. 
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awarded Norfolk Southern nominal damages of $1, as it had 
not suffered any compensable harm as a result of the breach of 
contract or the fraud.  PWV filed this timely appeal.   
 
II. 
  
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(1) and our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We exercise plenary review of a district court’s resolution of 
cross-motions for summary judgment and apply the same 
standard as did the district court.  Tristani ex rel. Karnes v. 
Richman, 652 F.3d 360, 366 (3d Cir. 2011).  We will affirm a 
grant of summary judgment where “there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A fact is material if 
it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 
law.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986).  On appeal from a bench trial, we review a district 
court’s findings of facts for clear error and exercise plenary 
review over conclusions of law.  VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile 
USA, Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 282–83 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 
III. 
 
 PWV argues that the District Court improperly made 
selective use of “course of performance” evidence to rewrite 
the terms of the Lease.  PWV also contends that Norfolk 
Southern defaulted on the Lease by (a) failing to pay the 
attorneys’ fees requested; (b) failing to record as indebtedness 
the proceeds of licenses, easements, and leases of the Demised 
Property; (c) allowing third parties to conduct resource 
extraction; and (d) allowing the amount of indebtedness to 
17 
 
exceed the 5% cap.  Finally, PWV asserts that it did not commit 
fraud in providing Norfolk Southern its Proposed S-3.  Each of 
these contentions will be addressed seriatim.  
 
A. Course-of-Performance Evidence 
  
 “The paramount goal of contract interpretation is to 
determine the intent of the parties.”  Baldwin v. Univ. of 
Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 636 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 587 
(3d Cir. 2009)).  Pennsylvania contract law begins with the 
“firmly settled” principle that the “the intent of the parties to a 
written contract is contained in the writing itself.”  Bohler-
Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Grp., Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 92 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (quoting Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 624 A.2d 638, 
642 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).  At the same time, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania has recognized that the “course of 
performance is always relevant in interpreting a writing.”  Atl. 
Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d 736, 741 n.6 (Pa. 1978); 
see also In re Old Summit Mfg., LLC, 523 F.3d 134, 137–38 
(3d Cir. 2008) (“A court always may consider the course of 
performance as evidence of the intent of the parties.”).  In its 
discussion of each disputed issue, the District Court first 
examined the language of the Lease and then discussed the 
parties’ course of performance.  It ultimately concluded that, 
in each instance, both weighed heavily in favor of Norfolk 
Southern.  Its use of course-of-performance evidence was both 
appropriate and necessary and did not contradict the language 
of the Lease. 
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B. Default 
 
 PWV also argues that the District Court should have 
found Norfolk Southern in default for entering into third-party 
agreements for subsurface extraction, for failing to record the 
proceeds from these and other agreements as indebtedness, for 
failing to pay indebtedness that exceeded the 5% cap, and for 
failing to pay PWV’s attorneys’ fees.  After analyzing both the 
language of the contract and the parties’ course of 
performance, the District Court granted summary judgment to 
Norfolk Southern on each of these issues.   
 
 PWV first challenges the District Court’s determination 
that the Lease allowed for third party agreements for 
subsurface extraction.  Section 1 of the Lease clearly provides 
that PWV leased, assigned, transferred, and delivered to 
Norfolk Southern, its successors, and assigns “all of [its] right, 
title and interest in and to all its property, real, personal and 
mixed, including equipment, machinery, tools, materials and 
supplies, cash, investments, securities, claims, intangibles, 
choses in action, rights (contractual or otherwise), obligations, 
interests, leaseholds and franchises, and including without 
limitation” the railroad and additional properties described in 
Schedules A and B.  (App. 831.)  PWV did not reserve any 
rights or interests in the subsurface coal, oil, gas, or minerals 
or the proceeds of any anticipated agreements, despite 
reserving rights to other property elsewhere in the lease.  
Moreover, after execution of the Lease, PWV transferred to 
Norfolk Southern various existing third-party agreements, 
including an oil and gas lease which expressly reserved no 
subsurface rights.  PWV also acknowledged and did not 
dispute transfers of subsurface rights during the lengthy course 
of the parties’ performance.  Given this evidence, the District 
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Court properly concluded that the Lease affords Norfolk 
Southern (and its sublessees) the right to enter into, control, 
and receive the benefits from third-party agreements, including 
subsurface extraction agreements.   
 
 PWV also argues that the District Court erred in finding 
that the Lease did not require Norfolk Southern to pay to PWV 
or record as indebtedness the proceeds from easements, 
licenses, or subleases of the Demised Property.  The first 
sentence of Section 9 states that the “demised property . . . may 
be sold, leased or otherwise disposed of by” Norfolk Southern.  
(App. 841.)  The second sentence of that Section deals with 
Norfolk Southern’s liability to PWV For “[t]he proceeds of 
sale, condemnation, or other disposition of the demised 
property . . . .”  (App. 842.)  Notably absent from this sentence 
is any reference to the proceeds of leases or other non-sale 
agreements authorized by the first subsection of Section 9.  The 
District Court agreed with Norfolk Southern that non-sale 
transactions did not need to be tracked as indebtedness 
because, while the Lease clearly includes leases in its grant of 
authority, it does not include them as transactions that need to 
be tracked as indebtedness.   
 
The parties’ course of performance supports this 
reading.  Norfolk Southern never listed the non-sale income 
received from third parties in its annual accounting, and PWV 
never disputed the failure to do so.  Further, PWV knew of the 
existence of third-party agreements because several had been 
transferred to Norfolk Southern at the time of the Lease’s 
execution, and it had assisted in the consummation of non-sale 
transactions after the Lease was executed.  The District Court 
did not err in granting summary judgment to Norfolk Southern 
on this issue.  
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 PWV then asserts that the Court erred in ruling that 
Norfolk Southern had not defaulted on the Lease by allowing 
its total indebtedness under the Lease to exceed 5% of PWV’s 
assets.  As discussed above, Section 16(a) provides that “the 
total of such indebtedness owing from [Norfolk Southern] to 
[PWV] . . . shall not exceed at any time an amount equal to 5% 
of the value at such time of the total assets of [PWV] as long 
as any of the obligations of [PWV] which have been assumed 
by [Norfolk Southern] in this Lease remain outstanding and 
unpaid.”  (App. 847.)  Norfolk Southern argued, and the 
District Court agreed, that this cap no longer applies because, 
in 1982, Norfolk Southern paid off the last of the debt it 
assumed from PWV.  Both the temporal language in the Lease 
and the existence of specific assumed obligations support this 
interpretation, and the parties’ course of performance only 
further confirms it.  Beginning in 1983, Norfolk Southern no 
longer reported the balance of its indebtedness, and PWV no 
longer reported the value of that balance as an asset, given the 
indefinite nature of the Lease.  Summary judgment in favor of 
Norfolk Southern was therefore appropriate.  
 
 Finally, PWV contends that Norfolk Southern defaulted 
on the Lease by failing to pay PWV attorneys’ fees and other 
expenses related to its review of the West End Branch 
transaction.  Neither Sections 4(b)(5) nor 4(b)(6), however, 
provide for the payment of attorneys’ fees, despite such 
language appearing elsewhere in the Lease.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, “counsel fees are recoverable only if 
permitted by statute, clear agreement of the parties, or some 
other established exception.”  Knecht, Inc. v. United Pac. Ins. 
Co., 860 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Montgomery Ward 
& Co. v. Pac. Indem. Co., 557 F.2d 51, 56 (3d Cir. 1977); 
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Corace v. Balint, 210 A.2d 882, 887 (Pa. 1965)).  While we 
have permitted an award of attorneys’ fees even in the absence 
of explicit contractual language, we have done so only when 
the context suggested that the parties intended litigation costs 
to be included.  See, e.g., Sloan & Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
653 F.3d 175, 186–87 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the term 
“expenses and costs” included attorneys’ fees in addition to 
other litigation related expenses and costs when used “in a 
paragraph discussing procedural mechanisms for lawsuits and 
other dispute resolution proceedings”) (citations omitted).   
 
 As the District Court noted, Sections 4(b)(5) and (6) 
address additional rent but make no mention of litigation costs 
in that context.  This is not true in other parts of the Lease.  For 
example, in Section 10(b), Norfolk Southern agreed to 
“indemnify [PWV] against liability, including costs and 
attorneys’ fees, which may be incurred by [PWV] under its 
collective bargaining agreements . . . .”  (App. 844.)  The 
parties clearly contemplated indemnification for attorneys’ 
fees, but did not explicitly provide for them in the section 
discussing additional rent.  The language in Sections 4(b)(5) 
and 4(b)(6) does not establish a “clear agreement” that Norfolk 
Southern indemnify PWV for attorneys’ fees in the review of 
a proposed sale under the terms of the Lease.  Knecht, 860 F.2d 
at 80 (citation omitted).  We therefore agree with the District 
Court that summary judgment was appropriate because 
Norfolk Southern did not default by failing to pay PWV’s 
attorneys’ fees incurred in its review of the West End Branch 
sale. 
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C. Fraud 
  
After granting summary judgment to Norfolk Southern on 
these issues, the District Court held a bench trial, after which it 
determined that PWV committed fraud in seeking Norfolk 
Southern’s consent to the rights offering.  PWV argues that the 
District Court erred in holding that the fraud claim was not 
barred by the “gist of the action” doctrine.  PWV also asserts 
that the fraud claim fails as a matter of law because Norfolk 
Southern did not suffer any injury proximately caused by the 
statements.   
 
 In Pennsylvania, a party must establish the following 
elements to sustain a common law fraud claim: “(1) a 
representation; (2) which is material to the transaction at hand; 
(3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness 
as to whether it is true or false; (4) with the intent of misleading 
another into relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance on the 
misrepresentation; and (6) the resulting injury was proximately 
caused by the reliance.”  Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 889 
(Pa. 1994).  According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, a 
fraud “occurs when one is induced to assent when he would not 
otherwise have done so.”  Tunis Bros. Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor 
Co., 952 F.2d 715, 731 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Delahanty v. First 
Pa. Bank, N.A., 464 A.2d 1243, 1251–52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1983)).  “Fraudulent misrepresentation may be accomplished 
‘by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, 
which deceives or is intended to deceive another to act upon it 
to his detriment.’”  Id. (quoting Delahanty, 464 A.2d at 1252).   
 
  During discussions to obtain Norfolk Southern’s 
consent, Lesser had assured Norfolk Southern that the 
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Proposed S-3 “contain[ed] all available information of PWV’s 
plans at [that] point.”  (App. 12526.)  The Proposed S-3, 
however, contained no information about PWV’s plans to 
restructure based on the Lease restrictions or to invest in 
alternative energy ventures, both of which Lesser had 
discussed in detail with PWV’s Board of Directors.  The 
District Court also found that Lesser “acted with intent to 
mislead Norfolk Southern into relying on his material 
representations,” and that Norfolk Southern “would not have 
granted PWV consent to issue shares had it known that PWV 
would act inconsistent with the assurances” it had made.  
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. R.R., 153 F. Supp. 
3d 778, 814 (W.D. Pa. 2015).  Finally, the Court determined 
that Norfolk Southern had suffered harm proximately caused 
by the fraud because, even though it could not reduce that harm 
to a monetary figure, the Lease no longer afforded it the same 
protection “bargained for by the original parties.”  Id.   
 
 The Court addressed and rejected the “gist of the action” 
argument PWV presents on appeal.  We agree with the District 
Court’s conclusion.  This doctrine prevents a party from 
bringing “a tort claim for what is, in actuality, a claim for 
breach of contract.”  Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48, 60 
(Pa. 2014).  As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:  
 
If the facts of a particular claim establish that the 
duty breached is one created by the parties by the 
terms of their contract—i.e., a specific promise 
to do something that a party would not ordinarily 
have been obligated to do but for the existence of 
the contract—then the claim is to be viewed as 
one for breach of contract. If, however, the facts 
establish that the claim involves the defendant’s 
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violation of a broader social duty owed to all 
individuals, which is imposed by the law of torts 
and, hence, exists regardless of the contract, then 
it must be regarded as a tort. 
 
Id. at 68 (internal citations omitted).  Courts must therefore 
determine “whether the nature of the duty upon which the 
breach of contract claims rests is the same as that which forms 
the basis of the tort claim[ ].”  Id. at 69 n.17.  As the District 
Court noted, Norfolk Southern’s claim does not arise from the 
contractual relationship between the parties, but rather from 
Lesser’s fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions in 
seeking Norfolk Southern’s consent.  Because this claim 
involves a “broader social duty owed to all individuals,” the 
“gist of the action” doctrine does not bar it, and a finding of 
fraud is appropriate.  Id. at 68.   
  
 PWV also contends that the fraud claim fails as a matter 
of law because Norfolk Southern could not demonstrate any 
compensable damages resulting from the misrepresentations 
and omissions in its Proposed S-3.  We agree with the District 
Court, however, that PWV’s fraud did proximately cause harm 
to Norfolk Southern’s interests in that the Lease no longer 
afforded it the same protections.  Therefore, despite an inability 
to establish compensatory damages, Norfolk Southern was still 
entitled to nominal damages of $1.00.  See Nicholas v. Pa. 
State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 2000) (“the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that because the basic unit 
of American money is the dollar . . . in the future, when 
nominal damages are awarded in our courts, one dollar ($1) 
shall be the measure thereof”) (internal quotation omitted).    
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IV. 
  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s April 22, 2015 order granting summary judgment to 
Norfolk Southern and its December 29, 2015 order finding that 
PWV committed fraud in seeking Norfolk Southern’s consent.  
